REBUTTAL OF IAN HARRIS' CRITICISMS OF BUDDHIST ECOLOGY

By far the most vocal and persistent opponent of the relevance of Buddhism to nature is British Buddhologist Ian Harris (1991, 1994a,b, 1995a,b, 1996, 1997, 2000). [Several of Harris' essays are available free in the online Journal of Buddhist Ethics at http://jbe.gold.ac.uk]. The gist of Harris' critique of what he terms ecoBuddhism is that: first, this is a recent American imposition on Buddhism and not an authentic interpretation of the texts; second, in Buddhism there is neither a concept of nature nor of the inherent value of other beings comparable to that of Western environmentalism; and, thirdly, Buddhism is escapist and not concerned with practical problems like the environment.

Harris (1995a:199) asserts that: "EcoBuddhism represents a modern American attempt to articulate an authentically Buddhist response to present environmental problems." Harris (1995a:200, 1995b:3,5) even suggests that this is primarily a West Coast phenomenon, although he also mentions New England Transcendentalism (see Clarke 1997, Tweed 1992). He cites Joanna Macy and Gary Snyder in particular as exemplars. Actually many Europeans and Asians could be cited as well which should be evident from our previous discussion. For instance, among the exemplars from Europe are Christopher Titmuss and Ken Jones in England and P.D. Ryan from Ireland. Buddhist ecology and environmentalism have much broader geographical, historical, cultural, and national foundations than just the U.S.A. (see Resources 3). Indeed, while Harris sees modern American environmentalism as an imposition on Buddhism, we have suggested in our previous discussion that Buddhism contributed significantly to the development of Western environmentalism in the first place!

In at least one of his essays, however, Harris (1995b:3) mentions Sulak Sivaraksa and Buddhadasa Bhikkhu as Asian Buddhist environmental activists, but notes that "the specifically Buddhist character of their actions are left unexamined or at best accorded "authenticity" merely by virtue of the fact that they are performed by high profile Buddhists." (Also see Harris 1997:387). Yet would they be prominent Buddhists if the vast community of Buddhists felt that they were not authentic Buddhists? Harris (1995b:8) even implies that the environmental interests of the Dalai Lama are motivated by concerns to obtain international funds! Harris (1995b:5) finds no "specifically Buddhist precedent" for tree ordination by monks in Thailand, but apparently the monks have done so (Phra Kru Pitak Nanthakun 1998). It appears that in Harris' peculiar concern with the dangers of contemporary environmentalist impositions on his idiosyncratic vision of pure Buddhism, Asian as well as American Buddhists are impure.

Harris (1991:110, 1995a:206, 2000:113-115) concludes that ecoBuddhism stems from contemporary secular concerns about the environment which impose their needs on Buddhism, rather than naturally arising from the heart of Buddhist tradition itself. Again, our previous documentation and discussion of the numerous and diverse ways and settings in which Buddhism and nature are relevant serves to refute Harris' assertion. Indeed, the Buddha himself lived during a period of environmental change and concerns, as previously noted.

For more than 2,500 years Buddhists have interpreted the Buddha's teachings to meet their own needs in their particular geographical, ecological, historical, cultural, and political contexts. If people had not found Buddhism relevant to their needs in such tremendously diverse circumstances, then it would not have spread throughout the world. If for over 25 centuries people could apply Buddhism to fit their needs, then why can't they do so in the present as well? Harris' insistence on texts as fossilized in past eras would render Buddhism irrelevant to the daily lives of subsequent Buddhists. He tends to ignore the dynamism and adaptability as well as the enduring core tenets of Buddhism, attributes which allowed its spread from northern India into other parts of Asia and beyond which continues to this day (see Harris 1995a:207 and Wallace 2001). Incidentally, Harris' assertion that today the religion of Buddhism is an anachronism, that is, not relevant to contemporary concerns like the environmental crisis because of its antiquity, could logically be applied to other ancient religions such as Christianity, but Harris only targets Buddhism with this allegation.

Harris' assessment of authenticity is also problematic, as should be clear from the points raised in previous sections of our essay. As Schmithausen (1991:57) notes, Buddhism did not develop in a vacuum, but shared some ideas with earlier and contemporary traditions (also see Bailey and Mabbett 2003). The principle of nonviolence, for example, is shared with Hinduism and Jainism. Shared or borrowed ideas in Buddhism do not necessarily undermine its authenticity. Buddhism is not monolithic, but includes numerous schools and sects as emphasized at the outset of this essay. In addition, there is the phenomenon of the local domestication of Buddhism and individuals adhering to other religions in addition to Buddhism (syncretism). The mere fact that Buddhism has endured for so long suggests that it has undergone many changes in the details of its manifestations, although the core principles persist (e.g., Goldstein 2002). Another problem is that texts may be multivocalic, that is, subject to varied interpretations by readers with different perspectives and concerns (Lewis 1997:340). Given all of this variation and variability, on what grounds does one pronounce one thing authentic and another not? In short, Buddhism did not become fossilized at any point in time or space like the purity of an insect preserved in ancient amber (see Snellgrove 1959:211-212).

Todd T. Lewis (1997:322) asserts that "...a sound working definition of a "good Buddhist" is simple: one who takes the three refuges and practices." In other words, puritanical, literalist, fundamentalist, or absolutist criticisms of the application of Buddhism to contemporary sociopolitical and environmental concerns, problems, and issues do not afford sufficient attention and credit to the actual lives of Buddhists where text and rigid doctrine are not considered to be as important as practice (see Lewis 1997:337, and Reynolds and Carbine 2000). Indeed, the Buddha repeatedly emphasized that individuals should test the principles in his teaching against their own knowledge, experience, observations, and reason, rather than simply blindly accepting authority, tradition, or dogma. Presumably that would include new information, situations, and challenges, and that would apply as well to Buddhists today including as they face the ongoing and worsening global environmental crisis.

From another angle, if a practicing Buddhist, especially a monk of many years who also happens to be a Buddhist scholar and writer, like someone of the stature of Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, the Dalai Lama, or Thich Nhat Hanh, thinks that Buddhism has some environmental relevance and acts accordingly, then surely this would be "authentic" if that term is of any utility in this matter.

Like many fundamentalists, Harris (1995a:200) is preoccupied with authenticity which he equates with textual purity:

Religious traditions like Buddhism may only remain true to their early canonical purity by continuing their long sleep, oblivious to the realities of the post-traditional order. Only then, assuming that this is even possible, can the imprimatur authenticity be convincingly given.

Again, why does Harris assert this only for Buddhism, and disregard its logical application to other religions like Christianity?

By Harris' reasoning, Buddhists should be silent about any contemporary sociopolitical, environmental, ethical, and moral problems, like the anthropogenic epidemic of species extinction together with ecosystem degradation and destruction; global warming and sea level rise, the ozone hole, and acid rain; nuclear weapons and waste; genetically modified organisms; and so on. Yet any religion which is not relevant to the contemporary daily lives and concerns of its practitioners would not be viable. Harris is a rare anomaly in denying such relevance based on his interpretation of texts when a multitude of Buddhists and Buddhologists affirm relevance as we discussed previously. Environmental problems generate the increased suffering of humans and other beings, thus they are inescapably pertinent to a religion whose pivotal concern is suffering and its reduction. Apparently Harris would also have Buddhists ignore scientific advances in understanding animals and plants, and remain at a level of knowledge and understanding of more than two and a half millennia ago (Harris 1995b:9, 1997:387,396). Yet there have been fruitful dialogues among a variety of scientists and Buddhists (e.g., Wallace 2003). If Harris' reasoning would be applied equally to all religions, then the world's ancient religions would be irrelevant to some of the most serious problems facing humanity and the whole global movement of spiritual ecology would be futile. Ironically, a scholar so concerned with the history of Buddhism ignores its recent course--- the sheer momentum and volume of activities in Buddhist ecology and environmentalism for several decades now in effect refutes Harris' stance (see Resources 3).

There isn't any concept in Buddhism equivalent to the Western one of nature, according to Harris (1991:104). However, Harris' semantic analysis is a diversion from the many areas of Buddhism that are clearly relevant to nature as demonstrated in our essay (e.g., Norberg-Hodge 1991, Rhys 1989, Ryan 1998, Tiyavanich 2003). Also, while Harris views Buddhist concepts like nonduality as rendering Buddhism irrelevant to environmentalism, other scholars hold the opposite opinion (e.g., Ingram 1997, Loy 2003). Harris (1997:378) accuses those who espouse the environmental relevance of Buddhism of being selective in the elements they discuss. However, American Buddhologist Donald K. Swearer (1997:39) says of Harris that: "His position is founded on too narrow a construction of the Buddhist view of nature and animals based on selective reading of particular texts and traditions."

Contrary to Harris, numerous textual sources have actually been identified as relevant to contemporary environmentalism (for example, see Batchelor and Brown 1992, Kabilsingh 1998, Kaza and Kraft 2000, Ryan 1998). Textual analysis, although ingenious and accurate, can be a very superficial approach to Buddhism if it is oblivious to the realities, complexities, difficulties, and accomplishments of daily practice by hundreds of millions of Buddhists. Also Harris (1997:379) undermines the importance of his concentration on text by questioning the extent to which the laity are actually influenced by texts and commentaries.

Harris (1995a:201) also complains about terminological revisionism, citing as an example Devall's (1990) idea of an eco-sangha. Curiously, no one else seems so concerned about authenticity as canonical purity, including respected individuals who are Buddhologists and/or Buddhists. For instance, the Dalai Lama wrote the Foreword to the anthology in which Devall's chapter appears. Harris (1995a:201) asserts that such neologisms reflect an "appropriation of Buddhism by the counter-culture" (also see Harris 1995b:3). He doesn't seem to recognize that the Buddha himself viewed Buddhism as in effect something of a counter-culture, as, for example, in his rejection of ritual animal sacrifice and the caste system of the Hindu Brahmins (e.g., Bailey and Mabbett 2003).

Harris (1994a:19, 21) views non-injury, compassion, and loving-kindness toward other beings as only intended to promote one's own interests (kamma), rather than reflecting a concern for the interests of other beings. Contrary to Harris, promoting one's own interests and that of other beings are not necessarily mutually exclusive, especially if they are interdependent. Furthermore, the Mahayana tradition of Buddhism developed around the ideas of the interdependence, mutuality, and ultimate identity of all beings in Buddha-nature, a perspective that generates compassion and loving-kindness for all beings (Bloom 1970:120). In addition, ecologists study the interdependence of organisms in ecosystems and evolutionists the impermanence of species through speciation, yet this doesn't necessarily dissuade them from being environmentalists and appreciating the intrinsic values of species and ecosystems. Furthermore, Swearer (1997:40) points out that: "... Buddhadasa's more biocentric perspective goes beyond such an instrumental understanding of nature as the ideal context for the pursuit of the ultimate goal of human flourishing. For Buddhadasa nature has an inherent dhammic value, not one merely instrumental to the monastic pursuit of spiritual transformation."

In Harris' (1994a:9, 11, 25) opinion, early Buddhism was a world-denying religion, especially for monks, and therefore nature and non-human beings are of no interest or value to Buddhists. However, monks can not renounce the world completely, they are dependent on it for survival--- food, clothes, shelter, and medicine, even as they seek enlightenment. What monks renounce is ignorance, greed, hatred, delusion, harming or killing any being, and so on. The Buddha advocated the middle way, rather than the extremes of either asceticism or hedonism. The middle way doesn't mean complete renunciation of the world. Suzuki (1956:254-256) makes clear that the practice of Zen Buddhism is not some form of escapism (cf. Eckel 1997:339 and Habito 1997). Engaged Buddhism confirms this and is nothing new as previously noted.

Harris (1991:101-102, 1995b:6-7, 1997:387-388) criticizes as romantics or idealists those Buddhists and Buddhologists who believe that in the Buddhist past harmony existed between humans and nature on the grounds that there is no evidence for any such "golden age." Actually, many cases of societies living sustainably in a dynamic equilibrium with nature have been documented. Ladakh is one of the clearest demonstrations of the environmental efficacy of Buddhism (Norberg-Hodge 1991). In Thailand, severe resource depletion and environmental degradation appear to be relatively recent results of Westernization, strongly implying that Buddhism and other factors helped maintain earlier societies in some degree of ecological balance (Sponsel 1998). The idea that no human societies have ever been in harmony with nature is a vacuous and fallacious over generalization (Sponsel 1997b).

In addition, Harris (1995b:7) questions "the claim that pre-modern societies were ecologically aware in the modern sense..." (cf. Grove 1990, 1995). (Also see Harris 1994a:8). However, in general, any society that is unaware ecologically is not likely to be adaptive and survive for very long. Most small-scale foraging, farming, and herding societies have an intimate awareness and knowledge of their local ecology on which they depend for survival and subsistence. Also most of them have cultural mechanisms that avoid irreversible resource depletion and environmental degradation (IUCN 1997, Sponsel 2001b, 2001c).
There are inconsistencies in Harris's arguments as well. In some places he denies the relevance of Buddhism for environmentalism, yet elsewhere Harris (1991) gives illustrations of such relevance: the way the Buddha employed natural imagery in his teachings (109); the Buddha refrained from harming plants and seeds (107); monks should refrain from digging in the ground to avoid harming organisms (105); meditation on the forest is a metaphor for all that is impermanent and subject to decay (108), and so on. More recently Harris (2000) wrote that constructing a Buddhist environmental ethics is impossible (114-115), but then points to Zen as a possibility (131).

Harris admits that animals and plants are to be respected in Buddhism because everything is interrelated, and he states that: "Buddhism endorses a spirit of toleration and cooperation with the natural world" (1994a:26). On the other hand, Harris (1991:106-107) denies that Buddhism views non-human beings as having any intrinsic value since they are viewed as interdependent and impermanent (also see Eckel 1997:343-345). Yet the monastic code discussed earlier demonstrates the serious attention monks are supposed to give to avoiding harm to non-human beings. Recall, for example, the rainy season retreat.

In our opinion, Harris' critique of environmental Buddhism targets mainly peripheral matters and is a mostly unproductive diversion. What is at the core of Buddhism is the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path which are focused on suffering and ways to reduce or eliminate suffering. As Roscoe (1994:5-7) observes about suffering: "In Buddhism there is no more important word, no more important concept." Furthermore, when a concern for suffering is extended beyond humanity to non-human beings, then logically it becomes an ecological and
environmental matter.

What appears to be behind Harris' critiques is a Christian bias. He seems to be defending Christianity's environmental virtue by attacking that of Buddhism and doing so ultimately within the framework of Christianity. For example, Harris (1991:102) asserts that:

"It is clear that those writers who support a putative Buddhist environmentalism are often, at least partially, motivated by strongly anti-Christian leanings. The Christian response to nature is condemned out of hand."

Essays on Buddhist environmentalism by Harris (1991:101, 111, 2000:113, 130-132) usually begin and end with a discussion of Christianity rather than Buddhism. He starts by misreading White's (1967) classic essay as a total rejection of the possibility that Christianity could have any positive relevance for the environment. Harris (1995a:209) even refers to "... White's prejudice in favor of Asian systems of thought...." Harris (1995b:7) writes: "White concludes that the correct course for future generations is to turn away from the European religious heritage towards those traditions that are deemed to offer a more positive view on our inter-relations with the natural world, i.e., to the religions of the East." On the contrary, what White (1967:207) actually wrote in the final section of his essay under the subheading "An Alternative Christian View" was that he is dubious about the general viability of Buddhism in the West! Instead, White proposes St. Francis of Assisi as a patron saint for Christian environmentalists. This is hardly the total rejection of Christianity in favor of Buddhism which Harris attributes to White. (Also see Harris 1991:102, 1994a:9, 16, 1995a:204, 1995b:7, 2000:131-132). If Harris' reading of a straightforward modern essay by an American historian is so flawed, then one can only wonder how accurate his reading of ancient Buddhist texts might be. Furthermore, Harris either purposefully ignores, or is ignorant of, the substantial literature on Christian ecotheology and spiritual ecology in general since White, and, in either case, that is problematic scholarship. [See Spring and Spring 1974 for a reprint of White's articles as well as complementary material, and Passmore 1974 and Hargrove 1986 for useful commentaries on White's thesis. A substantial literature has developed around the Christian ecology and environmentalism of St. Francis (Armstrong 1973, Nothwehr 2002, Sorrell 1988)].

According to Harris (1995b:1) what he calls eco-religiosity first developed in Christianity and only in the late 1980s in the case of Buddhism, and that, supposedly as a result of interfaith dialog initiated by Christians. Harris (1995b:7) even refers in a peculiar way to this interfaith dialogue between "Christianity and its client faiths." (A glance at Resources 3 and the dates of citations in our bibliographies reveal a quite different picture).

Harris (1995b:14) seems threatened when he observes that in the West "Buddhism is becoming more and more the religion of choice." From a Christian perspective, it is apparently intolerable to allow a religion that is not theistic and that supposedly finds no ultimate meaning in the universe (Harris 1994a:9, 11). Harris (1997:380, 2000:132) is also concerned about the possibility of eco-Buddhism in particular, and eco-spirituality in general, reverting to pantheism (cf. Whelan, et al., 1996). However, Harris (1991:111) does have some hope, namely, that Buddhism will be absorbed by Christianity!

Through his antagonistic critiques Harris in effect denies any environmental relevance of Buddhism for the more than 354 million Buddhists in the world. In so doing he also misses the whole point of the global spiritual ecology movement since the Assisi Declarations in 1986--- that the adherents of the various religions should each look into their own religion for guidance and inspiration in facing the modern environmental crisis. One of the most positive attributes of this movement is that it usually refrains from singling out any particular religion as either the cause or the solution for the environmental crisis, and instead promotes interfaith dialogue and mutual respect (see Gardner 2002, Tucker 2003, and the Forum on Religion and Ecology at Harvard University http://environment.harvard.edu/religion).

Whatever may be Harris' underlying views and motivations regarding Christianity and Buddhism, Buddhism itself also offers a striking contrast to his perspective:

It's worth noting that an acceptance of Buddhism does not necessarily require a rejection of one's parental or earlier life religion. In fact, Buddhism does not require anything of those who practice it. For Buddhism is not dogmatic nor catechistic. It does not preach sin. It does not say there is only one right way. It offers merely a path to wisdom, to enlightenment; the very word Buddha derives from buddh, to be awake, to be enlightened. The Buddha, the Fully Enlightened One, was a human being, not a divinity, a human being who was above all a teacher (Roscoe 1994:3-4).

In his essays Harris treats Buddhism at a theoretical level while neglecting it at the existential and institutional levels where the relationship with nature is much clearer (see Bloom 1970:119). Harris is academic rather than pragmatic, academic in the worst sense of the term, because the practical environmental problems facing humanity and the biosphere are far too serious to be ignored by Buddhists or anyone. He is also academic in the worst sense in ignoring a significant portion of humanity, Buddhists who often embrace some significant environmental concerns and actions in their daily life and practice.

Despite our refutations of Harris's argument, on the positive side he does offer in general a useful alert for Buddhists and Buddhologists to be careful in their interpretations of Buddhism's relevance to nature, ecology, environment, and environmentalism. Harris (1997:381-382, 395) also usefully cautions students and advocates of Buddhist ecology and environmentalism about making generalizations concerning Buddhism without sufficiently considering its historical, doctrinal, and cultural diversity, even though he fails in some instances to do so himself (cf. Swearer 1998:21). [For others who have criticized or cautioned about Buddhist ecology and environmentalism see Eckel 1997, Reinhold 1999, Schmithausen 1991, 1997, and Sponberg 1997].

See bibliography. Most of Harris' pertinent essays are available online in the Journal of Buddhist Ethics at http://jbe.gold.ac.uk.