There are two characteristics of language which have struck practically everyone who has written on that subject: its creativeness and its complexity. The "creative" aspect of language shows itself in its simplest form by the elementary face that most utterances are novel. Although phrases and expressions may recur many times the larger utterance in which they are embedded practically never repeat themselves in the act of composing. This novelty aspect of language use is so evident that it has been overlooked by some, notably many American psychologists who have written on the subject from the point of view of conditioning theory, and minimized by others, notably writers in rhetoric who reserve the epithet of "creative" to specialized techniques of language use (e.g. in literary works, poetry, theater). My own views on this, as will become evident in the course of the discussion to follow, is that all language use is creative, that composing an utterance involves the same basic processes whether it be done by an illiterate bushman or a renowned poet.
The complexity aspect of language needs no documentation. Even our most advanced linguistic theories today fall far short of explicating some of the most basic facts of language or of rendering explicit what every native speaker of a language intuitively knows. It might be worth noting that the nature of this complexity, appears to be different from other organized fields of knowledge, say as in the physical sciences. A physicist, for example, tries to explicate the structure and properties of matter and space and his discoveries give him increasing manipulative power over his environment as well as decreased knowledge. A linguist's theory, on the other hand, merely represents explicit formulations of knowledge already possessed by everyone. Similarly, a psychologist's attempt to build a psycholinguistic performance model of language use involves not so much the discovery of new "facts" but the explicit rendition of already "known" facts.
This distinction is important for certain crucial decisions of a tactical nature that linguists and psychologists have to make at the outset of their scientific endeavor. One approach takes the point of view that the "facts" to be explained are the objectively observable linguistic and behavioral phenomena: this has been the traditional scientific endeavor of American structuralist linguistics (with Bloomfield as its outspoken champion) and of the most influential school of psychology known as Behaviorism (with Watson and Skinner as its historic and contemporary champions respectively).2 I shall have little further to say about this approach. Its notable lack of success in both fields is now well known (see Chomsky, 1959; 1957).
The other approach takes the point of view that an adequate explanatory theory of the observable linguistic and psychological phenomena must deal with an account of the capacities of the human mind which make these observable phenomena possible. The crucial difference lies in the fact that the theoretical constructs involved in such an explanatory theory of "knowledge" are not derivable from observable behavior.3 Historically (see Chomsky, 1968; 1966) the scientific beginnings of this approach can be traced back to the 17th Century Rationalists. In contemporary times, the rationalist approach can be seen in the transformational generative linguistics developed by Chomsky, in European schools of linguistics identified with De Saussure in the Gestalt School of psychology, In the current "humanistic" approach in clinical psychology, in the theory of automata (both modern and 17th century versions), and in various schools of philosophy (old and new).
In the current writings of psychologists who profess a scientific interest in the psychology of language, it is not uncommon to read that there does not exist a performance model of language. It is my impression that they believe this quite literally (viz. they do not mean "an adequate" performance model). However, this is simply not true. Performance models of language are to be found in abundance in the fields of rhetoric, stylistics, literary criticism, "creative writing," and other endeavors like these (e.g. theories of translation). As far as I am aware, these theories and accounts about the act of composing linguistic utterances are mentalistic in kind, that is, they invoke explanatory principles such as "understanding", "intending", "knowing", "intuiting", "implying", "choosing", "deciding", etc.; these are terms which cannot be given an adequate behavioral definition4 - which is no doubt the reason why the existence of these accounts are being deliberately overlooked by contemporary "psycholinguists."
The position I have adopted in this chapter is a frankly mentalistic one. The scientific justification indeed, necessity - for rationalism and the use of mentalistic concepts in an account of language has been convincingly argued by Chomsky (1968; 1967 see also Katz, 1964). What I am proposing is that, we adopt, as a first step, the concepts and accounts of the act of composing that rely on intuitive knowledge, to accept them as bona fide concepts in a theory of language use. This is a descriptive stage. As a second step, I propose (for the future) a higher level of description which interrelates the phenomena at the descriptive stage, integrates them and attempts to "account" for them by a set of a priori statements ("rules", "laws") which will be able to generate the significant phenomena observed at the descriptive stage, and many more that have never been observed.
It should be clear from an intuitive knowledge of language use and from the earlier considerations raised with respect to the creative aspect of language, that the first stage that is here proposed is not to be viewed as an attempt at a full taxonomic description of the range of phenomena to be accounted for in a performance model of language. That would be as futile an attempt as a dictionary that set out to specify all the possible meanings of a given word by listing all the sentences in which that word could appear.
The purpose of the classification scheme
offered here is to attempt to establish the nature of the phenomena to be dealt with in a
performance theory of language. I will make no attempt to offer an explanatory account of
these phenomena, certainly because at this early stage of my work I have none to offer,
but also because such an attempt would be premature. In my opinion, further classificatory
attempts of this kind are necessary to establish securely the exact nature of the
phenomena that we must account for.
A few preliminaries.
Before presenting the classificatory scheme, it is necessary to introduce a few preliminary notions which I hold about the nature of language and its use. I think it is going to be necessary to distinguish between two types of competencies involved in the use of language: linguistic competence and communicative competence. Intuitively we recognize, such a distinction when we feel "speechless", not knowing what to say in some difficult social situation, or how to say something we desperately need and want to say to someone, or when we "bungle" a confession, or fail to communicate a "point", or misunderstand "the words" of a friend, etc. etc. In order to be able to introduce this distinction in more formal terms, we must define three levels of analysis for the meaning of an utterance: linguistic, implicit, and implicative.
(I) Linguistic Meaning: An utterance is made up of linguistic signs. Signs have lexical meanings of the type specified in a dictionary, projection rules specifying how they may be combined with other signs (also to be included in a dictionary), syntactic rules as defined by a derivative transformational theory, and phonological actualization rules. The grammar of a language assigns at least one semantic interpretation to every well-formed sentence by means of these various rules just mentioned: this is then the linguistic meaning of a sentence.
(II) Implicit Meaning: The dictionary meaning of signs are to be viewed as abstract representations of conceptual events to be clearly distinguished from specific conceptual events which signs represent when used in an utterance. The latter process is an elliptical derivative of the former. To put it another way, the meaning of a sign in the context of an actual utterance is based on its dictionary meaning but is never fully specified by it since the number of contexts in which the sign can appear and in which it has a specific and elliptically derived conceptual representation is potentially infinite.
An example will help clarify the relations involved. Consider the word "ball" as defined by the dictionary entry: "Noun. An evening assembly for dancing." The specific conceptual event to be recovered from the meaning of "ball" is different in each of the following sentences: "Joan's wedding ceremony was followed by a ball in the basement of the synagogue." "The opening of the diplomatic season was marked by a ball at Genevieve's attended by every foreign dignitary in Washington." "The ball that followed the graduation ceremonies at Baron Bing High School was crashed by the Black Tigers and turned into a fist fighting pandemonium."
What I refer to above as the "elliptically derived conceptual representation" is the definition I propose for the implicit meaning of an utterance. The nature of the information that allows this derivation will be specified in the classification scheme to be offered later, but let me note in anticipation that it includes elements that are not to be found directly in the context of the sentence, but lie in the listener's knowledge of the world and his culture and his capacity to engage in inferential reasoning. The fact that an utterance allows an elliptically derived conceptual representation is, in my view, one of the important principles to be incorporated (and elucidated) in a theory of language performance.
Consider now the relation between linguistic meaning and implicit meaning. While linguistic meaning (and the linguistic competence which underlies its derivation) is a pre-requisite for the understanding and composing of utterances, it is clear that the effective vehicle which communicates that for which language is being used is in fact the implicit meaning of utterances. Linguistic competence cannot generate the implicit meaning of an utterance and therefore it cannot form the basis for a theory of language performance.
(III) Implicative Meaning: An utterance, in addition to its relation to a conceptual event, also has a relation to the speaker himself: Where does he come from? Which dialect does he speak? What is his profession? What is his relation to the listener? What is his motivation in making the utterance? What status does he assign to the statement? Is he upset? etc. etc. Utterances provide clues to all of these questions and others as well. I shall define these kinds of information given by an utterance as its implicative meaning.
We have now considered the three levels of analysis for the
meaning of an utterance that are incorporated in the classification scheme to be
described. I shall concern myself with four aspects of a performance model of language: a
functional analysis of the meaning of an utterance, elements of style, selection factors
in the act of composing and the structure of the message. Here is an overview of what I
intend to cover:
1. A functional analysis of meaning
1.1. 1inguistic meaning
1.2. implicit meaning
1.2.1. aspectual
1.2.1.1. extended duration
1.2.1.2. limited duration
1.2.1.3. inception
1.2.1.4. iteration
1.2.1.5. gradualness
1.2.1.6. chronicity
1.2.1.7. termination
1.2.1.8. collectiveness
1.2.1.9. inaction
1.2.1.10. directionality
1.2.1.11. intensity
1.2.1.12. nonchalance
1.2.2. affective
1.2.3. aesthetic
1.2.4. contextual
1.2.5. situational
1.3. implicative meaning
1.3.1. sociolinguistic
1.3.1.1. geographic origin
1.3.1.2. education and SES
1.3.1.3. professional
1.3.2. emotional
1.3.3. intention
1.3.3.1. mands
1.3.3.1.1. request
1.3.3.1.2. command
1.3.3.1.3. prayer
1.3.3.1.4. question
1.3.3.1.5. advice
1.3.3.1.6. warning
1.3.3.1.7. permission
1.3.3.1.8. call
1.3.3.2. pseudo mands
1.3.3.2.1. superstitious
1.3.3.2.2. magical
1.3.3.3. intraverbals
1.3.3.3.1. grammaticalness
1.3.3.3.2. word associations
1.3.3.3.3. conventions
1.3.3.3.4. expressions
1.3.3.3.5. recitations
1.3.3.4. private tacts
1.3.3.4.1. feelings
1.3.3.4.2. opinions
1.3.3.4.3. rationalizations
1.3.3.5. public tacts
1.3.3.5.1. instructing
1.3.3.5.2. describing
1.3.3.5.3. entertaining
1.3.3.6. autistic utterances
1.3.3.6.1. verbal fantasy
1.3.3.6.2. self-tacting
1.3.3.6.3. self-manding
1.3.3.7. autoclitics
1.3.3.7.1. importance
(1.3.3.7.1.1. to 1.3.3.7.1.4. see text)
1.3.3.7.2. existential status
(1.3.3.7.2.1. to 1.3.3.7.2.10, see text)
1.3.3.7.3. relational status
(1.3.3.7.3.1. to 1.3.3.7.3.3. see text)
2. Elements of style
2.1. internal consistency
2.2. appropriateness
2.3. effectiveness
2.4. aesthetic value
2.5. affective value
3. Selection factors in the act of composing 3.1. intention
3.2. audience
3.3. situation
3.4. style
3.4.1. intraverbal influences
3.4.2. formal constraints
3.4.3. blendings
4. The structure of the message 4.1. syntactic
4.2. conceptual
1. A functional analysis of the meaning of an utterance.
1.1. Linguistic meaning: I refer the reader to the brief discussion in the previous
section.
1.2. Implicit meaning: Within the context of the earlier discussion on implicit meaning,
the following distinctions are possible.
1.2.1. Aspectua1 Quality: This is based on inferences one can draw about characteristics
of the specific conceptual event represented by a word or utterance; these characteristics
are not specified directly by the dictionary (linguistic) meaning of the lexical items
involved but are instead implied in them. Since aspectual qualities are conceptual in
nature one would expect some of these to be semantic universals. Here is a list of twelve
aspectual qualities that are salient in English. Their explication will be done by means
of contrastive examples.
1.2.1.1. Extended Duration:
"to stare" as opposed to "to notice"
"fearful" as opposed to "frightened"
"state of normalcy as opposed to "state of crisis"
1.2.1.2. Limited Duration:
"to strike" as opposed to "to beat"
"to gulp" as opposed to "to sip"
"He bites off a piece of bread" as opposed to "He bites his nails"
"As a student I never asked any questions in class" as opposed to "I was so
glad to see him that I never asked how he got there"
1.2.1.3. Inception:
"to doze off" as opposed to "to doze"
"obsolescent" as opposed to "obsolete"
"He is growing old" as opposed to "He is an old man"
"adolescence" as opposed to "manhood"
1.2.1.4. Iteration
"to nag" as opposed to "to criticize"
"to sob" as opposed to "to yelp"
"wave" as opposed to "line"
1.2.1.5. Gradualness
"to sag" as opposed to "to collapse"
"The stock market deteriorated" as opposed to "The stock market
crashed"
"change" as opposed to"metamorphosis"
1.2.1.6. Chronicity
"abstemious" as opposed to "sober" "to thieve" as opposed to
"to steal"
"The people of India are starving" as opposed to "I wish dinner were ready
because I am starving"
"querulous" as opposed to "edgy"
1.2.1.7. Termination 6
"He fell in the pool" as opposed to " I caught him as he was falling"
"John will lock up the house" as opposed to "John will be locking the
door"
"The pages of the old book have yellowed" as opposed to "The pages of the
old book are yellow"
"softened" as opposed to "soft"
"lengthened" as opposed to "long"
1.2.1.8. Collectiveness
"the paintwork" as opposed to "the paintings"
"a swarm of bees" as opposed to "the bees"
"slaughter" as opposed to "killings"
1.2.1.9. Inaction
"This mountain rises to 10,000 feet" as opposed to "This balloon rises to
10,000 feet"
"This action speaks for itself" as opposed to "The man can speak for
himself"
1.2.1.10. Directionality:
"to hire" as opposed to "to rent"
"half-empty" as opposed to "half-full"
"up here" as opposed to "here"
"bad luck" as opposed to "luck"
1.2.1.11. Intensity:
"icy" as opposed to "cold"
"to shatter" as opposed to "to break"
"filthy" as opposed to "dirty"
"ravenous" as opposed to "hungry"
1.2.1.12. Nonchalance:
"to toss" as opposed to "to throw"
"to glance through" as opposed to "to read"
"to nibble" as opposed to "to eat"
(Note some examples for which I can't find contrasts: "to flick", "to
saunter", "to lounge", "to pick up".)
1.2.2. Affective Value: I have in mind here the work on the semantic differential (Osgood,
Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957) which has identified three generalized components of the
implicit meaning of words: Evaluation, Potency, and Activity.7 (For example: MOTHER is E+
(high on positive Evaluation), SICKNESS is E-, ELEPHANT is P+ (high Potency), RABBIT is
P-, AIRPLANE is A+ (high on Activity), PYRAMID is A-.) There is good evidence (see Osgood,
1964; Jakobovits, 1966) that these three components are universals.8
1.2.3. Aesthetic Value: This refers to an evaluative judgment of the appropriateness of an
expression or choice of words that is based on specifiable but non-standard criteria (e.g.
"originality", vividness", "appropriateness of sensory metaphor",
etc.). The choice of the standards to be used as criteria, the question of whether these
are purely arbitrary or not, the problem of the reliability of such judgments, and further
issues of this kind remain to be worked out. (See also Section 2.4.)