IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT PSYCHOLINGUISTIC DEVELOPÐ
MENTS FOR THE TEACHING OF A SECOND LANGUAGE
Leon A. James
Center for Comparative Psycholinguistics
The University of Illinois
ÊTraditional psychological theories about language
acquisition emphasize the role of reinforcement provided by environmental
agencies and view language as a set of vocal habits that are condiÐtioned to
stimuli in the environment. Imitation and practice of new forms are the
processes by which language behavior develops and generalization of learned
forms is supposed to account for the novel uses of language. Recent
developments in linguistics have influenced our conception of the structure of
language, hence the nature of the knowledge that the child has to acquire. A
radically new psycholinguistic theory of language acquisition has been proÐposed
which emphasizes the developmental nature of the language acquisition process
and attributes to the child specific innate comÐpetencies which guide his discovery
of the rules of the natural lanÐguage to which he is exposed. Imitation,
practice, reinforcement, and generalization are no longer considered
theoretically producÐtive conceptions in language acquisition. The implications
of these new ideas for the teaching of a second language lie in the need for
controlled exposure of the student to linguistic materials in a manÐner that
will facilitate his discovery of the significant features of the language.
ãShapingä of phonological skills, discrimination training on sound ãunitsä and
pattern drills are rejected in favor of ãtransformation exercisesä at the
phonological, syntactic and semantic levels.
This
paper attempts to summarize some recently developed notions about the language
acquisition process and makes some preliminary suggestions about the
implications of these ideas for the problem of teaching a second language. The
original impetus in demonstrating the shortcomings of traditional psychological
and linguistic theories in the understanding of the processes of language
structure and language acquisition must be credited to Chomsky (1957; 959) who
also developed new theories to cope with the probÐlem. Subsequent writers have
elaborated upon this new outlook
ÎPaper
delivered to the 1968 convention of TESOL (Teachers of English to Speakers of
Other Languages) in San Antonio, Texas, March 9, 1968. The two sources to which
I am most indebted in the preparation of this paper are McNeill (1966) and
Lenneberg (1967) whose stimÐulating ideas it is a pleasure to acknowledge.
pointing out the various specific
inadequacies of the earlier notions and making concrete suggestions for new
approaches (see Miller, 1965; Katz, 1966; McNeill, 1966; Lenneberg, 1967;
Slobin, 1966; and several others; see also the contributions in Bellugi and
Brown, 1964). To appreciate fully these new developments it is necessary to
consider briefly the nature of the inadequacy of the earlier noÐtions on the
language acquisition process.
From Surface to Base
The traditional
psychological approach to the language acquisiÐtion process was to view it
within the framework of learning theory. The acquisition of phonology was
viewed as a process of shaping the elementary sounds produced by the infant
through reinforcement of successive approximations to the adult pattern.
Imitation of adult speech patterns was thought to be a source of reward to the
babÐbling infant and repeated practice on these novel motor habits was thought
to serve the function of ãstamping inä and automatizing them.
From
these elementary phonological habits the words of the language were thought to
emerge through parental reinforcement. It was said that the child could better
control his environment by uttering words to which the parents responded by
giving the child what he wanted. The child learned the meaning of words through
a conditioning process whereby the referents which the word signaled appeared
in contiguity with the symbol thus establishing an association. The acquisition
of grammar was conceptualized as learning the proper order of words in
sentences. Generalization carried a heavy theoretical burden in attempts to
explain novel uses of words and novel arrangements of sentences. Perceptual
similarity of physical objects and relations, and functional equivalÐence of
responses was thought to serve as the basis for generalÐizing the meaning of
previously learned words. Similarly, generaliÐzation of the grammatical
function of words was thought to account for the understanding and production of
novel sentences.
Two
aspects of this approach are noteworthy. One is that the burden of language
acquisition was placed on the environment: the parents were the source of
input, and reinforcement was the necesÐsary condition for establishing the
ãhabits.ä The child was merely a passive organism responsive to the
reinforcement conditions arÐranged by agencies in the environment. The second
aspect to be noted was the relatively simplistic conception of the knowledge to
be acquired: sentences were conceived as orderings of words, arranged in
sequential probabilities that could be learned then genÐeralized to novel
combinations. A general characterization of this overall approach would be to
say that the process of acquisition was from surface to base; that is, the
knowledge represented by language learning at all levels÷phonological,
semantic, syntactic ÷was entirely based on the relations contained in the overt
speech of the parents. The new approach to be discussed below can be
characterized by saying that it reverses this order; that is, the burden of
acquisition is now placed on the child with relatively minor importance
attached to the environment as a reinforcing agency. Furthermore, the
approach minimizes the relations conÐtained in the surface of language,
attributing the significant inforÐmation to be acquired to the underlying
structure of language, which is not contained in the surface input. However,
before taking up this new approach, I shall point out the specific inadequacies
of the earlier approach.
The
acquisition of phonology. The notion that the child first learns the constituent elements of the
adult phonemic structure and then produces speech by associating these elements
appears to be contrary to fact. In the first place, it is doubtful that speech
is made up of a concatenation of physically unique sound elements. A sound
typewriter which would convert each physically different sound into a different
orthographic type would not produce a very readable record (Lenneberg, 1967),
because speech recognition is not simply a process of identifying physical
differences in sounds. In fact, it requires overlooking certain acoustic
differences as unÐimportant and paying attention to certain other features in
relation to the acoustic context in which the sound is imbedded. In other
words, the ãcracking" of the phonological code of a natural language
involves a process of pattern recognition and equation, not simply learning the
identity of constituent elements. The first recognizÐable words of a child are
not composed of acoustically invariant speech sounds (see Lenneberg, 1967).
Therefore, a description of phonological acquisition in terms of learning
individual speech sounds which are then combined into words, must be false. FurÐthermore,
it is not clear how a notion of shaping by successive approximation can ever
account for the acquisition of sound pattern recognition and the discovery by
the child of phonological structure of a hierarchical nature.
The
acquisition of meaning. It is an indication of the simplistic character of previous
behavioristic views of language that they have concerned themselves with the
problem of reference to the almost total exclusion of the semantic
interpretation of utterances. RefÐerence deals with the relation between words
and objects or asÐpects of the environment. Psychological theories of meaning
(or
reference) were based on a
philosophical system of conceptualizaÐtion which now appears to be false;
namely the notion that ãwords tag thingsä in the physical environment. The
adoption of such a view led to elementary descriptions whereby a particular
combinaÐtion of sounds (a word) was conditioned to an object or set of objects.
When a new object having certain physical similarities to the one previously
conditioned was encountered, the learned verbal response was said to have
generalized to this new instance. More elaborate versions of this form of
theorizing were developed to account for the obvious fact that familiar words
would be used in connection with objects or situations which had no physical
simÐilarity to the originally conditioned object. However, due to the
requirements imposed by viewing meaning as a conditioned reÐsponse to a
stimulus, these later elaborations merely pushed back the locus of the
similarity from the external physical object to an internal (even though
functional) representation of that object. Thus an individualâs capacity to
understand the extension of the word eye in the eye of the needle was
thought of as arising from the fact that the internal conditioned responses
elicited by the word eye in the above phrase are similar in some
(unspecified) manner to the responses originally conditioned to the word eye
in such inÐstances as this is your eye, these are my eyes, this is the
doggy's eye, etc. The total inadequacy of this kind of approach as an exÐplanatory
device is this: it leaves obscure the specific nature of the similarity of the
conditioned response from the original to the extension, and it is incapable of
specifying the nature of the extenÐsion and cannot predict it until after it
has occurred. Thus, the view of reference as a conditioning process has the
same shortÐcomings for semantics as the view of conditioning of sequential
probabilities of parts of speech has for syntax. That is, the creÐative and
novel use of words which is so characteristic of language remains completely
beyond its explanatory range.
The
difficulties attached to these behavioristic explanations of meaning can be
resolved by abandoning the notion that ãwords tag thingsä in favor of the view
that ãwords tag the processes by which the species deals cognitively with its
environmentä (LenneÐberg, 1967, p. 334). This view reverses the order between
the object-stimulus and its conditioned response-process. That is, rather than
saying that the concept-meaning involved in the use of the word eye is a
conditioned process (external, internal, or cortiÐcal) developed as a result of
tagging various objects having certain characteristics and experiences relating
to them, this view says that the word eye tags a class of cognitive
processes developed through a categorization and differentiation process which
is indeÐpendent of verbal labeling. When a child (or adult for that matter) is
confronted with a new word, the new word acquires meaning only in the sense
that it comes to refer to a class of cognitive processes already possessed by
the individual. Novel uses of words, such as metaphoric extensions, are
understandable to others by virtue of the fact that human categorization and
differentiation processes are similar across the species, the word merely
serving as a convenient tag whereby these processes can be labeled. The
language of stimulus-response theory does not seem to offer any particular
advantages when conceptualizing the problem in this fashion.
A
conception of meaning such as the one just outlined, has certain implications
for a theory of semantics which it might be important to state explicitly.
Meaning becomes a purely cognitive concept (as linguists of a generation ago
used to believe) and seÐmantics represents the linguistic expression of these
cognitive operations. The problem of the development of meaning becomes the
problem of cognitive development, which is to say that the diÐmensions of
meaning-how the human species categorizes and differÐentiates the
universe-antedate the dimensions of semantics÷how cognitive categories and
relations find expression in linguisitc terms. An adequate theory of meaning
must be able to characterÐize the nature of this relation, namely the mapping
of cognitive to linguistic processes. Note that this theory includes not only
lexiÐcal (vocabulary) items, but also the morphophemic and inflectional system
of language, since the latter contain cognitive differentiaÐtions such as
present vs. past, animate vs. inanimate, definite vs. indefinite, mass vs.
count, male vs. female, plural vs. singular, and so on. It follows that an
adequate theory of semantics must concern itself not only with the vocabulary
of a language and the relation between words and things (reference) but also
with the manner in which the syntactic component of a language allows the
expression of cognitive relations (meaning). While the first aspect may be
conceptualized as a closed system such as that represented by a dictionary of a
language, the second aspect is an open system that cannot be described by a
taxonomy of properties or relations. In other words, while it is possible to
make an inventory of all the words in a language, it is impossible to make an
inventory of all the possible usages of any single word (with the exception
perhaps of most function words). An adequate semantic theory must thereÐfore
contain at least the following two things: (a) a model of huÐman cognition
specifying a finite set of dimensions or features, probably in the form of a
generic hierarchy of increasing inclusiveÐness as we move up the tree, and (b)
a set of finite rules (or transformations) specifying the possibilities of
manipulations of the elements in the tree. The description of (a) must be a
general psychological theory and is made up of ãpsychological or cognitive
universalsä as defined by the biological capacity of the human species. The
description of (b) must be a cultural and individual psychological theory as
defined by individual differences in general intelligence and in personal
experiences.
The
acquisition of syntax. The failure of behavior theory to account in any significant manner for
the problem of the acquisiÐtion of syntax can be interpreted as stemming from a
failure to recognize the complexity of the syntax of language. As long as
sentences are viewed as a sequential ordering of words or cateÐgories of words
and the phenomenon to be explained as a problem in the learning of sequential
probabilities of items or classes of items, no meaningful progress can be made.
The relations among the following eight sentences taken from Lenneberg (1967,
pp. 273-275) illustrate the complexities of the problem to be dealt with:
(1)Ê colorless green
ideas sleep furiously
(2)Ê furiously sleep
ideas green colorless
(3)Ê occasionally call
warfare useless
(4)Ê useless warfare
call occasionally
(5)Ê friendly young
dogs seem harmless
(6)Ê the fox chases the
dog
(7)Ê the dog chases the
fox
(8)Ê the dog is chased
by the fox
If one compares sentence (1) and (2)
it is evident that (1) is gramÐmatical while (2) is not. The difference cannot
be entirely in their meaning for, although sentence (1) is more likely to have
some meaning than sentence (2), nevertheless sentence (1) will be judged more
grammatical than sentence (2) even by the most prosaically inclined person. Nor
can it be said that the reason sentence (1) is more grammatical than sentence
(2) is that it is more familiar, since both sentences had a frequency of zero until
linguists began to use them a short while ago to make the kind of point that is
being made here. The ungrammatical string (4) has the same order of parts of
speech as the grammatical string (1), namely (adjective + noun + verb
+ adverb). Similarly, the grammatical and semantically interpretable
sentence (3)2 has the same order of parts of speech as the ungrammatical
and semantically uninterÐpretable string (2), namely (adverb + verb +
noun + adjective). Consequently, the transitional probability of
parts of speech in a
2Sentence (3)
might occur, as Lenneberg points out, "in an instruction booklet on pacÐifistic
rhetoricä (1967, p. 274).
sentence cannot account for either their grammaticality or their susceptibility to semantic interpretation. The same is true for the order of morphemes in the sentence as shown by the fact that senÐtence (5) which is both grammatical and meaningful uses the same order of bound morphemes (-ly, -s, -less) as sentence (2) which is neither grammatical nor meaningful. Sentences (6) and (7) demÐonstrate that the particular words used offer no clue to the meanÐing of the sentence. Sentence (8) can be recognized as having the same meaning as sentence (6) even though the order of subject and object is the same as that of sentence (7) showing that direcÐtional associations between the ordered elements are irrelevant to the understanding of the sentence.
These
various examples should suffice to convince one that the process of acquiring
language must involve a much more complex analysis procedure than that offered
by such surface relations of sentences as order of elements and
word-associations. As if this were not enough, we are confronted with the added
complication that the child is continuously exposed to both well-formed and
semi-formed and semi-grammatical sentences in the ordinary speech of adult
speakers. Out of this confused input, he has to be able to separate out the
false clues from the correct ones, yet he demonÐstrates this ability and
succeeds in the relatively short period of 24 months (roughly from age
one-and-a-half to three-and-a-half). Let us now turn to these newer
formulations of child language acÐquisition.
From Base to Surface
If we discard
earlier theories of language acquisition as unÐproductive, it is necessary to
start anew right from the beginning. The study of the acquisition of grammar
usually begins when the child is at about a-year-and-a-half, the time when he
begins to use two word combinations. Prior to that it is difficult to study the
childâs grammatical competence since he uses single words, and techniques have
not as yet been developed to study the childâs grammatical comprehension at
that early age. Speech records of a child over successive periods offer a
picture of a changing gramÐmar which the psycholinguist attempts to
characterize in formal terms by giving a description of its structure at each
period. This approach is necessarily limited since an inference of grammatical
competence must be made from the childâs speech performance, the latter being
affected by a number of variables that are not directly relevant to grammatical
competence (e.g. memory span, temporal integration, inattention, etc.). Given
this limitation, we can neverÐtheless inquire as to the kind of developmental
picture that emerges.
Differentiation
of general classes. Childrenâs
earliest utterÐances of two words (or more) exhibit non-random combinations of
words. Some examples from the speech of three children reported in the
literature are the following (McNeill, 1966, Table 1): big boy, aligone
shoe, two boot, that baby, here pretty. Distributional analysis of these
two-word combinations reveals that the words the child uses at this earliest
stage fall into two categories in terms of their privileges of occurrence. One
of the two classes contains a small number of words each having a relatively
high frequency of occurrence. Examples of this class include allgone, big,
my, see in one childâs speech, my, two, a, green, in a second
childâs speech, and in a third, this, a, here. The second class contains
a larger number of words and additions of new words to this class occur at a
higher rate (some examples are: beat, MomÐmy, tinker-toy, come, doed). Words
in this second class occur by themselves or in combination with words from the
first class, whereas words in the first class never occur alone. For these
reasons, the first class was named the ãpivotä class (P) while the second class
was named the ãopenä class (0). A shorthand exÐpression of these facts can be
represented by the following notation.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ SÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ (P) + 0
This notation implies that the
childâs competence includes a rule which says that a sentence, 5, can be
produced by combining any two words from class P and class 0 (in that order)
or, alternately, by using any single word from class 0. The rule excludes such
sentences made up of two words from the same class, or a senÐtence made up of a
single word from the P class.
It is to
be noted that the rule3 for constructing this earliest sentence
cannot have been developed as a result of direct mimickÐing of adult sentences.
Many of the two-word combinations that this rule generates are in the wrong
order from the point of view of adult speech (e.g. allgone shoe vs. the likely
adult model of the shoe is allgone). In addition, it permits combinations that
are unÐlikely to occur in adult speech at all (e.g. big milk). Such novel (and
non-adult) combinations and the ready substitutability of words within each
category are convincing arguments that these word combinations could not be
memorized limitations of adult speech.
Distributional
analysis of successive speech records of the children that have been studied
shows that the words in the original consciously aware of what he is doing.
ãRuleä is to he understood in its formal (mathematical) sense as an expression
that generates a set of operations of defined elements.
3The
concept of a
grammatical ãruleä as used in generative transformational linguistics in no way
implies that the individual is
pivot
class begin to subdivide into progressively more differentiÐated categories in
a hierarchical manner that can be represented as follows (based on McNeill,
1966, Fig. 1):
![]()
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ P1
![]()
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![]()
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ ArtÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ DemÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ P2
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ AdjÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ PossÊÊÊÊÊÊ P3
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ aÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ thatÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ bigÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ myÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ other
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ theÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ thisÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ redÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ yourÊÊÊÊÊÊ more
This representation shows that the
original pivot class (P1) subdiÐvided into three classes of words:
Articles, Demonstrative ProÐnouns, and all the rest (P2).
Subsequently, P2 subdivided into three further classes: Adjectives,
Possessive Pronouns, and all the rest
(P3).
The
implications of this picture are extremely important. Note that there is no
logical necessity for the development of grammatiÐcal distinctions to assume
this particular form of development. The child could have made up categories of
words on a trial and error basis, continually rearranging them on the basis of
evidence conÐtained in adult speech. He could thus isolate a category of words
that correspond to adjectives, or articles, or possessives, until he gradually
homes in on the full-fledged adult pattern. However, inÐstead of making, as it
were, a distributional analysis of adult speech, he seems to have come up with
a progressive differentiation stratÐegy that has the peculiar property of being
made up of a generic class at each point: that is, the original pivot
class must already honor in a generic form all the future distinctions at level
2; the undifferentiated pivot class at level 2 (P2) must contain in
a geÐneric form all the future distinctions at level 3, and so on. In other
words, the child seems to honor grammatical distinctions in advance of the time
they actually develop. How is this possible?
McNeillâs
conclusion is as bold as it is inevitable: the hierÐarchy of progressive
differentiation of grammatical categories ãrepresents linguistic universals
that are part of the childâs innate endowment. The role of a universal
hierarchy of categories would be to direct the childâs discovery of the classes
of English. It is as if he were equipped with a set of Îtemplatesâ against
which he can compare the speech he happens to hear from his parents. . .
We can imagine, then, that a child classifies
the random speciÐmens of adult speech he encounters according to universal cateÐgories
that the speech exemplifies. Since these distinctions are at the top of a
hierarchy that has the grammatical classes of English at its bottom, the child
is prepared to discover the appropriate set of distinctionsä (McNeill, 1966,
pp. 35-36).
The assumption of innate language universals is sure to be unacceptable to current behaviorist theories. Someone is bound to point out that one does not explain the ãwhyä of a complex pheÐnomenon by saying it is innate. The fact of the matter is, howÐever, that the complex behavior system of any organism is bound to be dependent upon the structural and functional properties of its nervous system. Language is a product of manâs cognition, and, as Lenneberg (1967, p. 334) points out, ãmanâs cognition functions within biologically given limits.ä Granting the innateness of lanÐguage universals, we are still left with the task of explaining the ãhowä of language acquisition. The scientific investigation of lanÐguage, both from the linguistâs and the psycholinguistâ s point of view, is to give an adequate characterization of the structure of the childâs innately endowed ãlanguage acquisition device,ä the naÐture of its universal categories and their interrelations.
The
development of transformations. The ability to manipulate transformations constitutes an
essential part of linguistic compeÐtence according to the linguistic theory
developed by Chomsky, and Lenneberg (1967) argues convincingly that
transformations are an essential aspect of categorization processes of all
biological orÐganisms. An insight into the nature of linguistic transformations
can be gained by considering the manner by which the following two sentences
are understood by an adult speaker (based on LenneÐberg, 1967, pp. 286-292):
(1)Ê they are boring
students
(2)Ê the shooting of
the hunters was terrible
Both sentences are semantically
ambiguous. The ambiguity in sentence (1) can be resolved by a process of
ãbracketingä which reveals that its constituent elements can be broken up into
two different ãphrase markers,ä4 as follows:
ÊÊÊÊÊ ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊÊ ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ SÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ S
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ÊÊÊÊÊ NPÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ VPÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ NPÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ VP
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
![]()
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ÊÊÊÊÊ PrÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ VÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ NPÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ PrÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ VÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ NP
![]()
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ AdjÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ N
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ ÊI
Ê {(They) [(are boring)
(students)]}ÊÊÊÊÊÊ {(They)ÊÊÊÊÊÊ {(are) [(boring) (students)]}}
4A phrase marker is simply a graphic representation of the
constituents of a sentence.
ãBracketingä
shown at the bottom of this figure is an alternative method of accomplishing
the same thing.
This phrase marker shows that the
ambiguity of the sentence lies in the fact that the word boring functions
in one case as an inÐflected verb-form, and in the other case, as an adjective
modifying the word students. Now consider sentence (2): it is ambiguous
in at least two ways (one could say that either the hunters need more practice
or they need a funeral!). Only one phrase marker descripÐtion is possible for this
sentence, so we need some other process to explain its ambiguity. One
interpretation is related to the senÐtence hunters shoot inaccurately, the
other, to the sentence hunters are shot. The reason we understand the
ambiguity of sentence (2) may thus be attributed to the fact that we are able
to recognize the relation between it and two other sentences each of which has
its own distinct phrase marker. This type of relationship is the essence of
transformations: they are laws that control the relaÐtions between sentences
that have ãgrammatical affinity.ä
The early
stages of child language competence does not apÐparently include the ability to
perform transformations, according to McNeill (1966) who relates the impetus
for acquiring transforÐmations to the cumbersomeness of having to manipulate
the eleÐmentary forms of sentences in the underlying structure of language
(ãbase stringsä). (More extensive discussion on the development of
transformations is not possible here. The reader is referred to McNeill, 1966,
pp. 53-65.)
Implications for
Second Language Teaching
The view on language acquisition that has been outlined may at first appear frustrating to those whose inclination and business it is to teach language. The claim that a child has achieved linÐguistic competence by age three-and-a-hail is likely to be scoffed at by the elementary school teacher in composition. At the claim that grammatical rules are discovered by the child through linÐguistic universals, the foreign language teacher is likely to wonder what happened to this marvelous capacity in the foreign language laboratory. In this section, I would like to examine the implicaÐtions for language teaching of the views outlined earlier on the language acquisition process. I shall discuss a number of topics including the role of practice and imitation, the distinction between competence and performance, and the nature of skills involved in foreign language acquisition.
The
role of practice and imitation. The assumption that pracÐtice plays a crucial role in
language acquisition has been central to earlier speculations. To Behaviorists
it is almost an axiom not to be questioned. This view rests on the basic
assertion that there
exists a fundamental continuity
between language acquisition and the forms of learning studied in the
psychological laboratory. Chomsky (1959), Miller (1965), Lenneberg (1967), and
others have questioned this view on general grounds and McNeill (1966) quesÐtions
it on more specific and reduced grounds. If we grant that the language
acquisition process is guided by the childâs innate knowledge of language
universals, does practice theory explain how children go about finding out the
locally appropriate expression of the linguistic universals?
Practice
theory leads to two possible hypotheses about language acquisition: one is that
when the child is exposed to a novel gramÐmatical form, he imitates it; the
other is that by practicing this novel form, he ãstamps it in.ä The evidence
available indicates that both hypotheses are false. A direct test of childrenâs
tendÐency (or ability) to imitate adult forms of speech shows that chilÐdren
almost never repeat the adult sentence as it is presented. A child does not
readily ãmimicä a grammatical form that is not already in his repertoire as
evidenced by his own spontaneous utterÐances. Direct attempts by the child at
imitation of adult sentences end up as recordings, as the following examples
taken from LenneÐberg (1967, p. 316) illustrate:
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊ Model
SentenceÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ Childâs
Repetition
Johnny is a good boy.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ Johnny is good
boy.
He takes them for a walk.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ He
take them to the walk.
Lassie does not like the water.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ He
no like the water.
Does Johnny want a cat?ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ Johnny
wants a cat?
It has been estimated that only
about ten percent of a childâs ãimiÐtationsä of adult speech are ãgrammatically
progressive,ä that is, embody a form novel to the child.
Whatever
the means by which novel forms enter the childâs speech, does practice
strengthen these responses? The evolution of the childâs command of the past
tense of verbs provides negaÐtive evidence to this question. In the childâs
early language, the past tense of the irregular strong verbs in English (came,
went, sat) appears with high frequency relative to the regularized /d/ and
/t/ forms of the weak verbs. Thus, we would expect that these much practiced
irregular forms would be highly stable, more so than the regular forms. Yet
evidence shows that they are in fact less stable than the less practiced
regular form, because at a cerÐtain point in the childâs development he
suddenly abandons the irÐregular form in favor of the regularized form and
produces comed, goed, sitted. This kind of discontinuity shows that the
practice model is not applicable here; rules that the child discovers are more
important and carry greater weight than practice. Concept attainment and
hypothesis testing are more likely paradigms in language development than
response strength through rote memory and repetition.
This realization
ought not to lead us to pessimism about the potential usefulness of language teaching.
There is strong evidence that the attainment of grammatical rules can be
facilitated by proper presentation of speech materials. Observation of
childrenâs speech during play interaction with an adult (usually the mother)
shows that up to half of their imitations of adult ãexpansionsä of chilÐdrenâs
speech are grammatically progressive (McNeill, citing data by Slobin, 1966, p.
75). An expansion is an adultâs ãcorrectionä of the childâs utterance. The
advantage expansions seem to hold over other samples of adult speech may be
attributable to the fact that expansions exemplify a locally appropriate
expression of a linguistic universal at a time when the child is most ready to
notice such a distinction. For example, if the child says Adam cry, and
the mother expands this by saying Yes, Adam cried (or Yes, Adam is crying÷depending
on her understanding of what the child intends), the child is thereby given the
opportunity to discover the specific manner in which the past tense form (or
progressive form) is exÐpressed in English at a time when this distinction is
maximally salient to him. The faster development of language in children of
middle-class educated parents may be attributable to a tendency on the part of
these mothers to expand to a greater extent than other parents. However, this
hypothesis needs further investigation.
On the
distinction between competence and performance. This distinction has been recognized
by all psychological theories, inÐcluding behavioristic ones (see Hullâs, 1943,
distinction between SER and SER). A confusion that may arise in language
behavior comes from the fact that understanding is usually (if not
always) superior to speaking and one might want to equate understanding
with competence and speaking with performance. However, this cannot be the
case. Both understanding and speaking must be viewed as instances of
performance since the non-linguistic factors that affect speaking (e.g. memory
span, temporal integration, inattenÐtion, etc.) are equally likely to affect
understanding. We are thus confronted with the fact that one type of
performance, understandÐing, appears to develop before another type of
performance, speakÐing. What may be responsible for this?
McNeill
(1966) examines the specific claim that every gramÐmatical feature appears
first in understanding and second in speakÐing and is led to the conclusion
that the overall parameters of conversion from competence to performance are
simpler, easier, and less complex in the case of understanding. In order to acÐcount
for this fact, he postulates three kinds of memory span of different size or
length, in the following order of decreasing magnitude: phonological
production, grammatical comprehension, and grammatical production. He
postulates these kinds to acÐcount for some data by Fraser, Bellugi, and Brown
(1963) showÐing that a child can repeat a longer sentence than it can either
understand or produce spontaneously, and also that it can underÐstand a longer
sentence than it can produce spontaneously. The difficulty with McNeillâs
hypothesis is that it equates sentence length with sentence complexity. It
would seem that it is easier to understand a long but simple sentence than a
short but involved one. It would also appear that one can understand a sentence
too long to be repeated. Children show evidence of having understood sentences
they cannot (or will not) repeat (see Lenneberg, 1967, p. 316). The problem may
be conceptualized in a different way, as illustrated by the following diagram:
Surface
Understand-ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ



Ê SurfaceÊÊÊÊ
Understand-ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ Surface
![]()
ÊÊÊ inputÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ ingÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ ÊÊ UnderlyingÊÊ CognitiveÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ SpeakingÊÊÊÊÊ output
ÊÊ speechÊÊÊÊ conversionÊÊÊÊÊÊ structureÊÊÊÊÊÊ processÊÊÊÊÊÊ conversionÊÊÊÊ speech
The asymmetry between the capacity
to perform the understanding conversion as opposed to the speaking conversion
may be related to the fact that the former requires an analytic approach while
the latter demands a synthetic capability. It may be that for humans, analytic
processes are easier than synthetic ones. One might say that it is easier to
learn the art criticâs job than the artistâs.
The
acquisition of foreign language skills. Let us raise the question of the specific relevance of our
discussion on first lanÐguage acquisition for an understanding of second
language learning and teaching. What are the parallels to be considered? First,
let us look at the argument for the differences. Assuming second language
acquisition which takes place after the age of four, one may point out the
following: (i) the individualâs cognitive development is at later and more
advanced stage; (ii) he is already in possession of the grammatical structure of
a language which may serve to facilitate the acquisition of a second one
through transfer; (iii) he already possesses concepts and meanings, the problem
now being one of expressing them through a new vocabulary.
The importance
of the first argument would seem to depend on the relevance of cognitive
development for the acquisition of language. The view outlined in this paper is
that the necessary knowledge for language acquisition cannot be gained from
experiÐence with the outside world and that language acquisition is deÐpendent
on an innate endowment which constitutes the knowledge of language universals.
Hence, the imputed advantage of advanced age and cognitive development is a
dubious proposition. The two other arguments are based on the assumption of the
operation of transÐfer in grammatical structure and in reference (vocabulary).
What is the evidence in support of this assumption? It is necessary to
distinguish between two claims about transfer theory. One refers to the general
expectation that new forms of learning do not go on independently of what the
organism has learned before. The truth of this statement would seem fairly
obvious and need not concern us further. The second and specific claim
expresses the expectaÐtion that the learning of certain specific and
identifiable elements in Task B is facilitated (or hindered) by the previous
learning of certain specific and identifiable elements in Task A. The status of
this strong claim for any type of complex learning outside the laboratory is
unknown. A serious test of it in second language acÐquisition would require the
prior analysis of the two languages in a form which would identify the specific
elements to be transferred at the grammatical and lexical levels. On a
priori grounds we would expect negative transfer as much as positive
transfer, asÐsuming that transfer is relevant to the problem. Carroll (1966b)
claims that the Modern Language Aptitude Test designed for EngÐlish speakers
predicts success in a foreign language equally well regardless of the
particular language involved. This fact is diffiÐcult to explain if transfer
has any overall relevance to the language acquisition process. Nevertheless,
some phonological studies on contrastive analysis reviewed by Carroll (1966a)
would seem to indicate the operation of negative transfer effects. He cites
Suppes et al. (1962) who ãclaim to be able to predict quite precisely from
mathematical learning theory what [phoneme] discrimination probÐlems will
ariseä (Carroll, 1966a, p. 16).
The
problem is complicated still further by the possibility that transfer effects
might affect performance and competence factors in different ways. Or, the
various performance factors themselves (understanding, speaking, reading, writing)
may be affected to difÐferent degrees. The same comment might be made for
different levels of performance, that is phonology, vocabulary, and syntax. A
further aspect to this problem is the consideration of whether transfer effects
are necessary processes or whether the extent of their operation is dependent
on the strategy with which the learner attacks the new task. An individual who
tries to ãfit inä the diÐmensions of the new task into the old structure may
encounter different problems from the individual who inhibits the interaction
of the two tasks, if we assume that the latter strategy is possible. Finally,
the fact that it is possible to predict errors of confusion, as in contrastive
analysis of phonology, is not necessarily an indiÐcation that transfer effects
will operate in the acquisition of the new task. Thus, the fact that the [1]
and [r] sounds are predictÐable areas of confusion for a Japanese learning
English says nothÐing about the way in which he will eventually learn the
distinction. It is unlikely that this distinction is learned in isolation.
Instead, it is more likely that the confusion will disappear when the overall
structure of English phonology is internalized.
The above
considerations lead to a number of implications for the teaching of a second
language which I shall now take up.
1. Teaching
the knowledge of structure: since it is clear that knowledge of language at
all levels consists of knowing patterns of relations rather than constituent
elements, the usefulness of efforts to teach the latter is in doubt. Examples
of such efforts include teaching specific sound discriminations, ãshapingä
phonological production, increasing vocabulary through association of
translation equivalents, and practicing specific morphological and inflectional
examples. Pointing to individuals who successfully acquired a forÐeign language
in a course using these methods has no force of argument, for it is quite
possible that their success occurred deÐspite these methods rather than because
of them.
2. Teaching
successful strategies of acquisition: Carroll (1962) has isolated a number
of factors which are predictive of success in a foreign language. These factors
may offer clues about the strategies that a successful learner uses with the
possibility that such strategies may be taught to those who normally make no
use of them. One of the abilities Carroll has identified deals with
verbalization of grammatical relations in sentences. The successÐful foreign
language learner is apparently capable of the following task: given a word
italicized in one sentence (e.g. ãThe man went into the house.ä) he can
identify that word in another sentence which has the same grammatical function
(e.g. picking one of the italicized words of the following sentence: ãThe church
next to the bowling alley will be built in a new location next
year.ä). We know of course that the individual is capable of recognizing
the grammatical relations in the second sentence (otherwise he could not give
it a semantic interpretation), so the ability must be one of explicit
verbalization of implicitly known rules and relations.
5Verbalizing
a grammatical
relation can take two forms; one refers to the type of stateÐment that can he
found in a grammar book that includes technical terms (relative clause, head
noun, modifier, predicate phrase, etc); the second refers to a statement of
equivalence or relation expressed in any convenient way using whatever
terms are available to the individual, whether technically correct or not..
The teaching of such verbalizations
therefore ought to facilitate foreign language acquisition.
Another
variable identified by Carroll ãis the ability to Îcodeâ auditory phonetic
material in such a way that this material can be recognized, identified and
remembered over something longer than a few secondsä (1962, p. 128). We do not
know at present the specific strategy that may be employed in facilitating this
kind of coding. Whatever the strategy may be, it seems unlikely that the superior
person in this task derives his advantage from a special innate capacity. In
the first place, the strategy is not related to the ability to perceive
phonetic distinctions, and second, given the biological foundations of language
capacity (see Lenneberg, 1967), we would not expect innate differences in the
general capacity of coding phonological material.
Contrastive
analysis of grammatical structure would not seem to offer particular advantages
beyond those provided by verbalizaÐtion of grammatical relations and by
attention to a grammatical distinction at a time of saliency (see the effects
of expansion, disÐcussed above). The expectation that the advantage of
contrastive analysis lies in making the contrast per se is based on an
assumpÐtion of transfer for which evidence is lacking. At any rate, the
pointing up of the contrast may just as well lead to negative transÐfer
by facilitating the assimilation (or ãfitting inä) strategy. I know of no
evidence that emphasizing distinctions of incompatible responses, especially
those that are automatized, leads to a deÐcrease in incompatibility.
3. Teaching
habit integration and automaticity: temporal inteÐgration of phonological
skills, both of understanding and production, is a problem independent of the knowledge
of the phonological strucÐture and transformations of a language. It would seem
likely that sensory and motor integrations of this type can be automatized
through practice and repetition. The more interesting problem would relate to
the time at which automaticity practice is likely to be valuable and to the
form it is to take. Reading represents a different aspect of phonological
production skill than speaking, as is well known, and practice in reading does
not represent a suffiÐcient or necessary condition for achieving automaticity
of phonoÐlogical production in speaking.
The
factors that enter into the problem of automatizing gramÐmatical habits are not
very clear. Tests of speech comprehension under conditions of noise (see for
example Spolsky et al., 1966) seem to be quite sensitive to the level of
automaticity and degree
of integration achieved by a foreign
language speaker. They show that the problem of integration goes deeper than
high proficiency in understanding and speaking demonstrated under ordinary
condiÐtions. At the moment we do not have available a psychological theory of
sentence understanding or production. The relevance to this problem of recent
experiments on latency of various gramÐmatical manipulations still remains to
be shown. Many language teachers seem to be convinced that pattern drills serve
to automatize grammatical habits. However, it is difficult to justify this
expectation on theoretical grounds. I have already argued that the semantic
interpretation of a sentence cannot be viewed as a process of sequential
analysis of categories of words. Thus, pattern drills, at best, can serve only
to automatize phonological production skills, and for this latter purpose,
other methods may prove equally, if not more, effective. At any rate, if the
pattern drill argument is taken literally, namely that the structure is
automatized through practice of the specific pattern that is being repeated,
then the learner could never achieve automatized speech. This consequence must
follow since in ordinary speech we use an infinite variety of patterns, and,
therefore, since the second language learner could not possibly be drilled on
an infinite variety of patterns, he could never develop automatized speech.
Hence pattern drill cannot posÐsibly do what it is supposed to do.
From a
theoretical point of view, the development of gramÐmatical competence should be
facilitated by getting the learner to perform a set of transformations on
families of sentences (e.g. I cannot pay my rent because I am broke; If I
werenât broke I could pay my rent; Given the fact that I have no money, I
cannot pay my rent; How do you think I could possibly pay my rent if I am
broke; Since I am broke, the rent cannot be paid; To pay the rent is imÐpossible
given fact that I have no money; etc.).G The distincÐtion between this
exercise, which we may refer to as perhaps a ãtransformation exercise,ä and
ãpattern drillä is that the first deals with the competence involved in deep
structure while the second focuses on surface structure. As Rutherford7 has
shown in his paper read earlier at this Convention, surface structure
similarities are completely unenlightening as to the semantic inÐterpretation
of sentences.
6One
of the films
shown at the TESOL Convention had a demonstration of just this idea. It was
made by the Ontario Citizenship Branch. The instructor, Ray Santon, referred to
this technique as ãstructure drillä (in opposition to ãpattern drillä).
7"Deep
and Surface
Structure and the Language Drill,ä a paper delivered at the TESOL Convention by
William Rutherford of the University of California at Los Angeles.
The
notion of transformation exercises is equally applicable to phonology and
vocabulary. DeCamp has given us some examples of practice exercises in
phonological transformations in his paper read earlier at this Convention.
Exercises in vocabulary transÐformations are more difficult to specify at this
stage of our knowlÐedge, but from our earlier discussion of meaning we can
perhaps anticipate giving the student a task of this kind: ãChange the folÐlowing
list of words using the sex transformation: boy, father, bull, sunä÷which
might yield: ãgirl, mother, cow, moon.ä Other examples might include
asking the student to give opposites, simiÐlars, subordinates, super ordinates,
and so on, in a restricted word-association task. Semantic relations of this
kind may be responsiÐble for the well-known psychological fact that in memory
words are organized in clusters (see, for example, Deese, 1965).
4. On
semi-grammatical sentences: the fluent speech of most native speakers does not consist
totally (or even in the majority of instances) of well-formed sentences. One
would imagine that the imposition of a requirement to utter exclusively
well-formed sentences would seriously hinder the fluency of most native speakÐers.
The logical implication of this observation would be that no language teacher
should ever force his pupils to use only well-formed sentences in practice
conversation whether it be in the classroom, laboratory or outside. This
conclusion is not as odd as it might seem at first sight. After all, children
seem to acÐquire the competence to produce well-formed sentences despite the
semi-grammaticality of the adult speech to which they are continÐually exposed.
It is important to note that semi-grammaticality does not mean randomness. The
reason that in most instances we are able to give a semantic interpretation to
semi-grammatical sentences lies in the fact that we have the capacity to relate
these semi-sentences to their well-formed equivalents. There must therefore
exist lawful transformations between semi-sentences and well-formed ones. We
are able to understand the speech of chilÐdren for the same reason: the grammar
of their utterances is generic of the later grammar of well-formed sentences.
If it were not so, we would not be able to expand (hence, understand) their
utterances.
An important question poses itself at this juncture: should second language teaching take specific account of the developmental stages that are likely to mark the acquisition of a language? By ãspecific accountä we mean at least the following two propositions:
ÊÊÊÊÊ 8The
Current Discrepancy between Theoretical and Applied Linguisticsä a
paper delivÐered at the TESOL Convention by David DeCamp of the University of
Texas.
First, to recognize and allow the
production of semi-sentences on the part of the learner; and second, to expose
the learner of utterÐances which are grammatically progressive at each stage
but which fall short of having the full complexity of well-formed sentences.
The first proposition may already be the policy in some modern and intensive
audio-lingual methods which encourage active speech production ãat any costä
(sic). The second proposition is sure to be resisted by most teachers; yet
the fact of the matter is that all ãnaturalä language acquisition situations
expose the learner to semi grammatical sentences more often than not. We do not
know whether these are facilitative or retarding situations. Some parÐents tend
to talk to their children by attempting to imitate their speech and it is
sometimes said that this kind of ãbaby talkä reÐtards acquisition. The evidence
on this point is simply lacking. It may be, of course, that the fastest method
of acquiring a second language need not be one that replicates the conditions
existing under ãnaturalä language acquisition. In fact various claims for
highly intensive language courses followed by individuals with high foreign
language aptitude put the time requirement for the acquisiÐtion of a foreign
language at between 250 and 500 hours of study (Carroll, 1966a, b). Compare
this figure with a minimum estimate of 3,000 hours for first language
acquisition.9 Of course, the two situations are not directly
comparable and the level of competence achieved may be different (especially by
measures of automaticity and background noise, see Spolsky, et al., 1966);
nevertheless, the comparison highlights the fact that the ãnaturalä rate of
language acquisition process can be greatly accelerated. It is important to
note that although the language acquisition capacity per se must be
viewed as an innate capability shared by all members of the speÐcies, the rate
at which language is acquired, especially a second language, and the
effectiveness with which language is used as a communicative process are
performance factors that are affected by individual differences within the
species (variations in general intelligence, in experiences, in physical health,
in motivation, etc.). It is here that the concept of teaching may assume
its full imÐportance.
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Bellugi, Ursula and Roger Brown,
(Eds.). ãThe Acquisition of Language,ä Monographs of the Society for
Research in Child Development, 29 (1964).
Carroll, J. B.Ê ãResearch In Foreign Language Teaching: The
Last Five
9This rough figure is arrived at by estimating the total waking
hours of a child up to age three-and-a-half and taking thirty percent ofÊÊ
that as an estimate of the amount of exposure to
Years.ä In R. 0.
Mead, Jr., Editor,Language Teaching: Broader ConÐtexts, Northeast Conference
on the Teaching of Foreign Languages: ReÐports of the Working Committees. New
York: MLA Materials Center, 1966a.
Carroll,
J. B. ãIndividual Differences in Foreign Language Learning.ä Paper presented at
the Thirty-Second Annual Foreign Language Conference, New York University
School of Education, November 5, 1966b. Carroll, J. B. ãThe Prediction
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Pittsburgh:ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1962.
Chomsky,
Noam. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton, 1957.
__________
Review of Skinnerâs ãVerbal Behavior.ä Language, 35 (1959), 26÷58.
Deese,
James. The Structure of Associations in Language and Thought. BaltiÐmore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.
Fraser,
C., Ursula Bellugi, and Roger Brown. ãControl of Grammar in ImiÐtation,
Comprehension, and Production,ä Journal of Verbal Learningand Verbal
Behavior, 2 (1963), 121÷135.
Hull, C.
L. Principles of Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1943.
Katz, J.
J. The Philosophy of Language. New York: Harper, 1966.
Lenneberg,
E. H. Biological Foundations of Language. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1967.
McNeill,
David. ãDevelopmental Psycholinguistics.ä In Frank Smith and 0. A. Miller
(Eds.), The Genesis of Language: A Psycholinguistic Approach. Cambridge,
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Miller,
G. A. ãSome Preliminaries to Psycholinguistics,,, American PsyÐchologist, 20
(1965), 15÷20.
Slobin, D. I. ãThe Acquisition of Russian as a Native Language.ä In Smith and Miller (1966).
Spolsky, B., B. Sigurd, M. Sato, E. Walker, and
Catharine Arterburn. ãPreÐliminary Studies in the Development of Techniques for
Testing Overall Second Language Proficiency.ä Indiana Language Program, Indiana
UniÐversity, Bloomington, Indiana, 1966 (mimeo.).
Suppes, P., E. Crothers, Ruth Weir, and Edith Trager. ãSome
Quantitative Studies of Russian Consonant Phoneme Discrimination.ä
Stanford, Calif.:Ê
Institute for Mathematical Studies In the Social Sciences, Technical ReÐport
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