The Behavioral
Technology of Discourse Analysis
Leon James
Univ. of Hawaii ©
1972
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ It is common to
elevate language and speech to a universal medium of exchange in all human
affairs; .we can hardly find a behavioral setting that does not involve
language, either overtly, or privately, in thinking. Given this ubiquitousness
of language in behavior it is certain that behaviorists, social engineers, and
the helping professions will rely more and more on the technology of discourse.
This field is not yet established though a significant beginning was made by
B.F. Skinner in the classic Verbal Behavior (1957). Subsequently to its initial
interest, which was that language, speech, and thinking can be included in the
behavioral tradition, no further significant development in theory was made.
The promise of a technology of verbal behavior failed to ignite with success
the offices of psychotherapists, social workers, or classrooms. There is
actually much talk of the failure of the public educational system to teach
adequate skills in reading and writing. The point is that a successful
technology of discourse is going to greatly and visibly improve the
effectiveness of psychotherapy, counseling, and teaching. What is needed for a
successful technology of discourse? This article gives a proposal for
cataloguing discourse products in a natural, empirical way rather than through
an arbitrary theory. A method of discourse analysis is outlined which shows up
the functional relations between discourse-as?product and discourse?as?process.
No previous proposal exists to our knowledge in which this interrelation has
been accomplished successfully, from the requirements of the behavioristic
tradition.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ Skinner?s
contribution was specifically to prove that discourse production is
behaviorally lawful. He outlined a powerful theory that distinguishes three
basic behavioral building blocks called ?mands?, ?tacts?, and ?autoclitics.?
Mands are verbal behaviors in response to an internal need and under the
control of the individual?s
cumulative history of reinforcement. For example, requests or questions are
types of discourse called mands (mand is from demand). Tacts are verbal
behaviors that are under the control of external or internal sensory awareness.
For example, describing an object or some past event, generates discourse
fragments that are tacts (from contact). Autoclitics are verbal behaviors that
have an organizing function; for example, grammatical and rhetorical sequences
can be selected by the speaker so as to achieve a particular goal. This occurs
because listeners are strongly affected by the composition of the discourse
they are exposed to. A successful discourse technology, as foreseen by Skinner,
would allow the practitioner to know enough about the organization of discourse
and its functional properties to be effective in using discourse as a change
agent. Clearly, many behaviorists have already incorporated this view in their
practice (e.g., Meichenbaum, Tharp, Watson, Heiby, and others). Still, there is
clearly a need for advancing the state of our theory of the functional analysis
of discourse so as to allow for a more specific application of the
behaviorist?s general idea of mands, tacts, and autoclitics.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ As well, there
is a need to rescue the behavioristic point of view on discourse from the low
level to which it was assigned by Chomsky?s devastating attack on it (1960). It
will be seen that the present proposal by passes this entire controversy, and
merely goes on from where Skinner left off. No doubt there will be many in the
cognitive linguistic camp who would relish to retrace the errors of Chomsky?s
arguments in the light of this proposal. We leave the task up to them. Still,
Chomsky?s attack on the behavioristic view of language has cast doubt on the
validity and viability of Skinner?s proposal. It will be seen from the present
proposal that the behavioristic view is far from dead, and that indeed, it is
the only one right now that offers the potential of an applied discourse
technology which society greatly needs.
Behavioral Definition of
Discourse.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ Discourse is
the visible organization of invisible mental and affective states. By analyzing
the elements of discourse and their functional dependence, we gain knowledge on
the functional relations in mental and affective states. The control of
behavior depends on a knowledge of social reinforcers and their contingent
management. Discourse analysis provides information on social reinforcers and
contingency schedules. This is because overt discourse is functionally
dependent on inner mental and affective states. Thus, the organization of
mental and affective states in an individual will determine the visible
characteristics of discourse productions by that individual. The converse of
this is a technological application: by analyzing the characteristics of the
discourse productions of individuals, we can gain information on their inner
mental and affective states.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ This idea is
generally recognized by all, namely, that language provides clues as to the
person?s thoughts and feelings. Nevertheless, to bring this idea down to the
level of technology it needs further behavioristic development. Especially,
what is wanted is a functional analysis of discourse content, and the
behavioral correlates of the functional units.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ With this in
view, we may define discourse as verbal behaviors at three levels of
organization. This will be the fundamental premise of our proposal, including
of course, the sufficient identification of the three levels. As well, the
method of identifying functional units in discourse must be empirical and
natural; that is, the units must be in the language of behavioral contingency
management. These are technologies of behavior based on reinforcement
principles.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ The organization
of discourse must parallel the organization of mental and affective states
since there is a functional dependence between inner states and outer
behaviors. Skinner has argued that inner states are built up and maintained by
environmental conditions. This idea is well known in general in that one acts
according to one?s motives and through the means of
our habits and skills. In the general sense, therefore, we would expect that
discourse organization reflects thoughts and feelings. But in a specific or
particular sense, this principle tends to break down in the absence of a
behavioristic outlook. For example, Freud argued that slips of the tongue are
under the functional control of avoidance affect. Literary criticism and
rhetoric are two fields filled with proposals on how to measure the
effectiveness of writings. Many people develop an intuitive perception of
variations in discourse style; others are effective in the use of metaphor and
simile. Still, these personal insights need to be translated into a scientific
technology. There is a real problem to overcome in the fact that the content of
discourse is so complex that a non?systematic approach bogs down in arbitrary
cataloguing systems, of which there are many exemplars in the literature. The trouble
with these is that not everyone can agree that the arbitrary system is
sufficient for their needs. A system of discourse analysis that satisfies the
research needs of the linguist does not suit the clinical psychologist or
teacher. What is suitable for the language teacher is not for the counselor or
on the job training. This proposal is offered as a general solution suitable
for all and relying only on known basic laws of behavior.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ The three
levels of verbal behavior must be the same three levels in which we already
distinguish behavior, namely, sensorimotor, cognitive, and affective.
Behaviorists use the word ?behavior? to refer to the sensorimotor effects of
reinforcement history. Walking, moving, pushing, talking, writing, driving,
eating, and so on. In general, these behaviors are public and interpersonal.
Each person?s behavior is a visible discriminant stimulus to others, and so,
the behavior of one influences the behavior of another. Skinner referred to
thinking, which is private, as verbal behavior under community management. In
other words, the discourse content of thinking is under the control of social
reinforcers. This relation is evident in general: what we think at any one time
is influenced by the environmental requirements.À A characteristic of
behavioral settings is that they demand our attention in specific ways; when we
drive, when we listen to a lecture, when we compose a letter - these are clear examples of how the content of our thinking
varies with the stimulus demands of the setting.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ It is
consistent therefore to assume that that all inner states of thinking and
affective habits are built up and maintained by social reinforcers as managed
in the community throughout its various behavioral settings. Some people might
associate our idea with ?thought-control?; but this concept seems to suggest
that that the individual is not free to select social reinforcers, when yet
there is that freedom. The criticism is fallacious because contingency
management relies on the existing social reinforcers, by definition.
Individuals remain free to devalue normal reinforcers in a community, and many
do, as we witness from all sorts of novel lifestyles. Thus, there is no
?thought?control? in the control of verbal behavior since the control is managed
by means of people?s own freely chosen values and priorities. The expression
control implies, not lack of freedom, but systematic methods of exercising
freedom. Behaviorists are dedicated to the maintenance of true freedom through
effective techniques of operation. This is the same position as that of
legislators: the restriction of alternatives for the sake of the freedom and
good of all.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ Social
reinforcers are always organized in a community. For example, people can make
up lists of valuable things in our society: money, health care, recreation,
friendship, pleasant housing, and so on. Whenever these reinforcers are present
in the environment they can be utilized for the technology of behavior. The
organization of social reinforcers may be also be called community contingency
management. Each reinforcer will be present under certain conditions, and the
amount available will also vary on specific contingencies. Money is obtained
through gifts or services provided; friendship is selective; health care requires
membership; and so on. Minimum wage legislation is an example of an attempt to
modify the organization of social reinforcers.À
Any change in the
organization of social reinforcers is accompanied by a change in the behavior
of targeted individuals whose behaviors are maintained by those social
reinforcers. For instance, an employer may offer merit increases contingent
upon performance criteria. The availability of this new source for money
creates a new specific channel for social reinforcement and behavioral
modification. If the company withdraws the offer there is a concomitant change
in the organization of the setting?s social reinforcers. It is important to
realize that the changes in behavior occasioned by a change in social
reinforcers occur at three levels of behavior: sensorimotor behavior, cognitive
behavior, and affective behavior.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ Let us trace
the three levels in connection with the example. The company makes a new rule,
crating the availability of a new social reinforcer. Targeted individuals will
now be influenced at three levels of behavioral organization. At the
sensorimotor level, the influence will be visible in a number of ways:
discussion of the new plan, expressions of approval or disapproval, longer work
hours, less errors, better quality performances, and so on. These are the
results the company is primarily interested in. Nevertheless we know that these
sensorimotor behaviors are not under the direct control of the social
reinforcers. If they were, then management would be greatly simplified. As
managers know, changing a rule or giving a new incentive works with some up to
a point. This is no doubt due to conflicting social reinforcers. Still, it is
clear that social reinforcers do not operate directly upon sensorimotor
performance but through the mediation of cognitive and affective behaviors. The
new rule about merit increases tied to specific behavioral performances will
operate through the inner states of the individual: mental operations, decision
making, contrastive analysis, daydreaming, specific motives, preferences,
habits.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ We need
therefore a specific proposal for the empirical classification of behavior
units in terms of these three levels.À
In an important sense, the problem of classifying behavior units and the
problem of classifying discourse units is one and the same. This follows from
the premise that all discourse units are overt behavioral units, which in turn
are under the functional control of social reinforcers. Thus, whatever is being
proposed about the organization of discourse must ipso facto apply to the
organization of behavior. We shall now proceed to the characterization of the
three levels of discourse, and the reader may continually filter every
statement through the test of whether it applies equally to behavior laws
already known. Any category definition for a discourse unit must have a clear
behavioral effect, or else the proposal is no longer behavioristic.
Level C.ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ Sensorimotor
level of Discourse.
ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ This natural
category may be defined as verbal behaviors in the form of sensorimotor habits.
These are external, overt, and public. Children, chimpanzees, dolphins, and
computers are among the well known examples of successful programs to produce
discourse. For example, the earliest discourse fragments produced by little
children consist of their attempt to label an object in view or an internal
sensation such as hunger or loneliness. The labeling of something produces
discourse whose content consists of particular facts about what things are.
Describing the memory of an experience, for instance, produces discourse whose
content consists of labeling dramatic sequences as they occurred.