NOTES

David C. Rapoport, 1999, "Terrorism," Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict, San Diego, CA: Academic Press 3:497-510.

The phenomenon of terrorism may be quite ancient, but the concept is modern (p. 498). Examples of ancient terrorists include the Assassins in early Islam, the Zealots in 1st century Judaism, and the Thugs in 13th to 19th century Hinduism (501). During the French Revolution from 1789-1799 some groups used acts of terrorism, and even created a culture of terror, as a desperate means to establish a democratic order. However, only as late as the 1960s, did scholars begin to wrestle with the definition of terrorism (499). Yet the media, especially in the U.S.A., confuses the issue to avoid being seen as blatantly partisan by alternately applying different labels to the same account--- terrorists, rebels, guerrillas, and soldiers (499-500).

There is also the problem that through time some individuals, formerly recognized as terrorist leaders, have become something else, from George Washington of the American colonies to more recently Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Yasir Arafat of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Front), Menachem Begin of Israel, and Nelson Mandela of South Africa.

Clearly terrorism is not reducible to simply senseless violence or evil. Often underlying the desperate acts of terrorism, apparently random and extraordinary violence against innocent civilians, is a desperate frustration with prolonged injustices wherein no alternative remedy appears available and effective. Terrorism is a form of violence that ignores conventional distinctions between guilt and innocence, and/or, combatants and noncombatants. The victims of terrorism are a means to confront a target--- government policy or public opinion (500).

Since the 1880s, there have been four major waves of terrorism on the international scene, each with its own particular characteristics, main purpose, and peculiar techniques. Each of the first three waves lasted for only about three to four decades, and the fourth which began around 1979 is still in progress. There was some overlap between the waves, and each left surviving organizations even if diminished in strength.

The first wave began in Russia during the 1880s, triggered by unfulfilled massive reform movements, and leading to systematic assassination campaigns against government officials. Subsequently, this political assassination variant of terrorism spread into the Ottoman Empire with the Armenian revolutionaries, and into the Balkans (pre-Yugoslavian region). Foreign states provided haven for refugees, while diasporic constituencies provided moral and financial support for remaining terrorists.

The second wave began after World War II, and lasted for about two decades, as nationalist rebels sought self-determination from the victorious states of the war and/or from colonial powers. But by the 1960s, most former colonies gained independence, and with that political transformation usually terrorism subsided (e.g., Ireland, Cyprus, Yemen, Algeria, and Kenya). Guerrilla techniques of hit and run, especially against the government police force, were the main tactics of this wave (501).

The third wave started in the 1960s, with a revolutionary ethos or spirit. The West, and especially the U.S.A., was its primary target. This wave included the Vietcong against the invading Americans, and within America, the Weather Underground and other groups. Elsewhere revolutionary terrorist organizations included the Red Army Faction in Germany, Red Brigade in Italy, and Tupamaros in Uruguay. Separatist movements also resorted to terrorism, like the PLO, Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA), Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia, Peasant Front for the Liberation of Corsica, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Such activities were labeled international terrorism. Some states used foreign terrorists to implement their international policies, such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya. The main tactic of many left-wing terrorists during the late 1960s into the 70s was airplane hijacking, averaging a hundred annually. They were often spectacular media dramas. On the other hand, during the 1960s and beyond in many Latin America countries, right-wing state sponsored death squads killed millions and created a culture of fear. These were often covertly trained and supported by the U.S. government and other First World states [e.g., School of Americas] (502). The third wave began diminishing in most places the 1980s.

The fourth wave of terrorism was more clearly associated with religion, yet it exhibits the most brutal and deadly attacks. One epicenter was the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Shia terrorists such as Hezbollah operated in Europe as well as the Middle East such as Lebanon. It developed a striking new tactic, suicide bombing or self-martyrdom. Sunni Islamic extremists stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Sunni terrorists also operated in many states with Islamic populations, such as Syria, Tunesia, Morocco, Algeria, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Muslims from all parts of the world fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet invaders and with American support. Meanwhile, Jewish terrorists attempted to blow up Islam's most sacred site in Jerusalem, the Dome of the Rock, murdered some 29 worshippers in Hebron in 1994, and assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995. In Japan, the religious organization Aum Shinrikyo, a syncretic millennarian movement with elements drawn from Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism, released nerve gas in a Tokyo subway killing 12 people and injuring nearly 5,000 others. In the U.S.A., the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City by Timothy MacVeigh and associates could be considered a domestic terrorist incident (503). (Of course, domestic terrorism in the U.S.A. has a long history, such as in the case of the white racist supremacist Ku Klux Klan or KKK).

Nevertheless, for all the attention and concern, terrorist organizations are usually small in size. Most do not have more than 50 individuals, although 4-6 outsiders are required to provide support for each member. But some terrorist organizations have memberships of a few hundred, and a few well over a thousand. Urban terrorists, however, involve small cells of about five individuals each, because of the need to hide in the urban environment and maintain secrecy (503-504).

The longevity of terrorist organizations is also usually small, with perhaps 90% enduring no more than a year, and about half of those that survive longer disintegrate within ten years. But many have successors that endure, more or less. The IRA has operated for more than 80 years, the Basque ETA 38 years, the PLO 29 years [as of 1999]. The longevity of the fourth wave which Rapoport calls sacred terrorists is as yet uncertain (504).

One other aspect of the demography of terrorist organizations is that they are overwhelmingly composed of males younger than 30 years of age. Terrorist organizations attract individuals in their physical prime, with enormous enthusiasm, little patience, and willingness to take great risks, according to Rapoport. Also many terrorists are middle-class university students (504). [This also suggests that in affluent states with a graying or aging population pyramid, terrorism is less likely to flourish, but of course, it only takes a few young individuals].

Despite all of the above and the high profile of international terrorism [and government and media hysteria since 911], the chances of any individual becoming a victim of terrorism is extremely remote--- one is as likely to die of an animal attack or accident in the bath. Car accidents are far more likely. The average number of victims of terrorism [excluding state terror] since the early 1970s is 350 annually. Furthermore, most victims are government officials (usually diplomats) or individuals in business. However, domestic terror within some states is 20-30 times higher than the international statistics. For instance, from 1954-1962, the Algerian Front for National Liberation (FLN) killed 95,000 people (505).

Also most terrorist groups without a distinct ethnic base do not succeed. When granted more regional autonomy, ethnic enclaves often retreat from using terrorism for separatist movements, such as the case of the Basques in Spain. The 1993 Oslo Accord was leading to the establishment of a separate Palestinian state with international recognition, until the peace negotiations collapsed. Nelson Mandela's 1995 Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa could well serve as an effective model for nonviolent conflict resolution and peace maintenance elsewhere between state and terrorist factions (505).

Various theories to explain the emergence of terrorism have been offered by academics and others, including technological, psychological, and conspiratorial. The technological explanation views terrorism as a byproduct of new innovations in weaponry, transportation, and communications, but, of course, does not explain ancient or older forms of terrorism. The psychological explanation considers terrorists to be abnormal personalities with distinct pathological traits, but that it just to simple. The conspiratorial explanation viewed terrorism as a Cold War phenomenon instigated by the Soviets as surrogate warriors, but terrorism involves far broader international matter. None of these single-factor explanations is sufficient to explain such a complex, varied, and variable phenomenon as terrorism (506).

A political factor is that terrorism occurs most often in states that are democratic, or moving in that direction, instead of in the most oppressive regimes. Terrorism can also be viewed as a public recognition and pursuit of the sovereignty of the people (self-determination) instead of royal or other sovereignty, an idea inherited from the French Revolution. Furthermore, the "right" to employ terror is sometimes claimed as an entitlement of the "weak."
At the same time, terrorism often receives more attention by the government and media than what many consider to be the underlying or ultimate causes--- oppression and exploitation, poverty, injustices including human rights abuses, and so on. Rapoport even asserts that "The unhealthy tendency of democratic governments to become preoccupied with terrorist incidents and to make unrealistic promises about quick results partly reflects media-generated pressures." But he notes that, while the media may encourage terrorists in some ways, it simultaneously shortens their longevity in other ways (507).

With regard to government policies pursued to counter terrorism, Rapoport writes:

"There may be no "solutions" to terrorism in a democratic state. But specific conditions and particular public responses do help explain the ebb and flow of terrorist activity. Terrorism normally combines criminal and political (or religious) activity with a mode of violence so peculiar that it alludes ordinary conceptual categories. Terrorists always claim a prisoner-of-war status, even though they reject the associated traditional military norms; and their dependency upon secrecy makes it necessary for governments to waive claim to have military immunities from interrogation. Yet a policy of regarding all terrorists as criminals simply is unwise, because sometimes it strengthens those with significant political constituencies" (507).

Also he notes that in cases of serious terrorist campaigns, state governments may resort to using torture to interrogate suspected or verified terrorists [in spite of international human rights conventions against torture]. Likewise, civil and political rights may be reduced during periods of terrorist campaigns to allow increased surveillance and for other reasons, but they may not be restored afterwards. On the other hand, special immunities for repenters can sometimes have an enormous impact in demoralizing terrorist organizations.

Beyond increased intelligence, surveillance, and security activities by a government, other responses to terrorism can include changing international law (e.g., this greatly reduced airplane hijacking); improved cooperation within and between countries; and reprisals by individuals or allied states (508). Multinational sanctions, although rare, have sometimes been implemented and some with success. The U.S. air attack on Libya aided by the British and supplemented by a European Community arms embargo, appears to have reduced Libya's involvement with terrorists. Nevertheless, as early as 1980, in President Reagan's administration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig identified terrorism as the single most important international problem (509).

Finally, Rapoport offers some interesting ideas about the future of terrorism. It will remain part of the international scene, but its rise and fall can not be forecast. As in the past, the trajectory of terrorism will continue to be linked with unexpected major political transformations. As with every wave of terrorism so far, separatism will remain a significant ingredient.

Weapons of mass destruction are less likely to be used than the usual guns and explosives. Chemical weapons have been available for 80 years, but so far almost complete ignored by terrorists. (The most notable exception is Aum Shinrikyo in Japan). [They have been used in state terror, however, such as in Iraq against the Kurds]. Although each wave has been rather different, especially in its targets, strategic priorities, and methods of delivery, the weapons have remained the same. This restraint on the use of weapons of mass destruction stems from a desire to win public support, the moral reservations of terrorists themselves, and operational difficulties. (Accidents account for as many casualties among terrorists as those from security forces). However, the casualty count from recent religious terrorism is far higher than from earlier waves. [And this article was written before 911].

In summary, Rapoport's survey reveals some very important and interesting points about terrorism: that it is hard to define, but includes extraordinary violence against unconventional victims (non-military) with a broader target of influencing government policy and/or public opinion; it is nothing new; since the 1880s there have been four waves, the fourth (religious) continuing; the first three waves each lasted three to four decades; terrorist organizations usually have a small membership (less than 50 individuals, although some are much larger); membership is mainly young males up to 30 years of age, often middle-class and educated; most terrorist organizations do not last more than 1-10 years, unless they have a strong ethnic base of support; weapons of mass destruction are very unlikely to be used, rather guns and explosives will continue to be the preferred weapons of terrorists; terrorist leaders may subsequently become respected political leaders concentrating on nonviolent reconciliation and peace; state government and media often overreact and become obsessed with the superficial symptoms of terrorism to the neglect of the underlying or ultimate causes, principally economic and sociopolitical injustices; and the chances of becoming a victim of terrorism are far less than having a car accident. Furthermore, state governments counter terrorism with increased intelligence, surveillance, and security activities which simultaneously erode the very civil and political liberties on which democracies are based.